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While philosophical hermeneutics has often been criticized for not engaging issues concerning 
the body and human finitude, Gadamer’s “Defense of Pain” in his final public academic 
appearance is an underappreciated hermeneutic contribution to the way in which we experience 
and respond to the physical and existential demands of pain. In light of his criticism, that the 
modern medical community is occupied with the utter eradication of pain, Gadamer is concerned 
with the consequences of such a sensibility which does not appear to focus on developing and 
fostering the patients’ own capacities and participation in the process of their own convalescence. 
For Gadamer, the patients’ active participation in the recovery (verwinden) from pain is an 
opportunity to experience the joys of recovery and to engage in their own vibrant rhythm of 
health. Yet more than this, pain is an opportunity to return to an existential and hermeneutic truth 
about one’s own finitude. Through reflections on the newborn’s cry at birth (Geburtsschrei) and 
the forgetfulness of our own mortality, we find in Gadamer’s presentation an intriguing account 
of pain as a deeply embodied and hermeneutic experience that furthers interpretation and 
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A common criticism of contemporary hermeneutic philosophy is that hermeneutics often 
neglects the topics of embodiment, the body, and an existential concern for one’s mortality.1 Yet 
what is perhaps just as neglected is the way Hans-Georg Gadamer takes up these themes in his 
essays and lectures on health and suffering. Perhaps most overlooked, and still untranslated, is 
the transcript of a presentation he gave on the topic of pain, in what would be his last official 
public appearance.2 On the one hand, Gadamer’s “Defense of Pain” is a further entry in his 
efforts to distinguish the art of healing from the modern science of medicine in the technological 
age and to reopen the question of what it means to be healthy in the modern world.3 Yet more 
than this, Gadamer points toward something of much greater concern in our response to the 
physical and existential demands pain.   
 
In the first part of this essay, I discuss Gadamer’s comments on the topic of pain in his 2000 
lecture and his concern with modern medicine’s combative disposition towards pain. Instead of a 
recovery (Verwindung) from pain that includes the active participation of the patient, Gadamer 
points to an attitude in modern medicine that wishes to eradicate pain as if it were an enemy to 
be fought and destroyed. Furthermore, Gadamer suggests that to fight pain in this manner is to 
risk a kind of existential forgetfulness and lose out on the joys of taking part in one’s own 
recovery. I then turn to several of Gadamer’s previous texts in order to frame and respond to his 
questions and concerns in his “Defense of Pain.” His comments on the person of experience in 
Truth and Method show how pain, disruption, and openness towards these experiences have 
always been crucial to Gadamer and hermeneutic experience. Likewise, in his essay, “On the 
Enigmatic Character of Health,” what is decisive for the rhythm of health is the very painful 
disturbance of this health, as well as the experience of recovering from this disturbance. Lastly, I 
consider the existential implications of Gadamer’s “Defense of Pain” by turning to his essay, 
“Anxiety and Anxieties,” and the image of the birth cry that arises in both texts. In this, I suggest 
that our experience and recovery from pain awakens us to the ungraspable mystery of our own 
birth and death at the heart of hermeneutic experience. 
 
For Gadamer, pain is an opportunity to return to a forgotten truth about our own mortality. As we 
shall see, he suggests that pain not only echoes the child’s first intimation of mortality in the 
newborn’s cry at birth (Geburtsschrei), but always and again invites us to return from a profound 
forgetfulness of our relation to our own death. As I wish to argue, pain is an opportunity to 
confront our own mortality that rings out in the image of the birth cry and allows us to return to a 
forgotten, perhaps repressed, tension between our incessant striving to understand the mystery of 
death, and of our inability to ever grasp this mystery. Accordingly, pain is not only an 
opportunity to take part in our own recovery and to be active in the vibrant rhythm of our own 
health, but is ultimately a call to return to an authentic encounter with our own finitude. In 
turning to Gadamer’s presentation on pain, we find an intriguing account of pain as a deeply 
embodied and hermeneutic experience that furthers interpretation and understanding of our own 
intimate relationship with birth, death, and life.   
                                                 
1 For more on the body and mortality in hermeneutics see Kearney and Treanor (2015), Aho (2017), and  
Risser (1997).  
2 See Gadamer (2010). The conference was held at the Orthopädischen Universitätsklinik Heidelberg in 
2000. 
3 In Hermann Lang refers to Gadamer’s talk on pain as an “Apologie des Schmerzes” (an “Apology” or 
“Defense of Pain”). See the afterword in Gadamer (2010).     
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Gadamer on Recovering (Verwinden) from Pain 
 
To begin, I want to offer a brief account of Gadamer’s comments on pain, the birth cry, and 
forgetfulness in his final lecture in order to frame this larger discussion of pain as a return to 
recovery, health, and the mystery of one’s own death. Gadamer’s last public presentation 
(Gadamer, 2010), while important, remains untranslated and warrants careful attention, 
especially in the few passages I wish to consider. While Gadamer touches on many interesting 
facets of his own life and experiences with pain, the crucial moment of the lecture involves his 
provocative assertion that pain is not something to merely be numbed, ignored, or eradicated, 
rather, pain is something both patient and doctor must appropriately orient themselves towards, 
engage, and recover from. Pain is something one must develop a sensibility for precisely through 
one’s experience with pain. Instead of an enemy that must be eliminated by the doctor, pain is 
that which challenges us and demands a response that is not a submission to the illness, but 
rather a call to develop our own strengths and abilities in the process of our own healing and 
convalescence. But perhaps more than this, Gadamer suggests that pain is an opportunity to 
confront something we have forgotten, something we are reminded of when we contemplate the 
newborn’s cry at birth.   
 
Gadamer introduces his brief account of pain with an initial reflection on this birth cry 
(Geburtsschrei), which is perhaps our first memory or encounter with pain: “What is, for 
example, the initial birth cry? An expression of pain? Does one know such a thing? Can one 
know such a thing? I don’t know” (Gadamer, 2010, p. 22).4 This initial cry at birth is a profound 
and particular response to an unbelievable and unimaginable change in existence, namely, one’s 
emergence into the world (p. 22). The cry at birth in response to the radical shift into existence 
indicates that life immediately begins with, among other things, pain and alienation (p. 22). It is 
already in this moment that the cry at birth signals a conversation with the unseen other (the 
mother and/or doctor) (p. 22).5 For Gadamer then, this cry at birth is both a reaction to what is 
radically new and a prompting towards a conversation with the newness of the world. One greets 
the world, and is greeted by the world, through a painful and alienating newness of experience.   
 
Towards the end of his talk, after various illuminating digressions, he returns to a discussion of 
pain and articulates the life-long role of pain that starts out from the initial cry at birth and 
continues into the muted, yet persistent pain of old age. As he explains, one’s particular 
experience with pain is difficult to convey because “we are in pain and cannot separate this pain 
from ourselves. Pain, as it were, encompasses our lives and consistently challenges us anew. 
What pain demands from us is considerable” (Gadamer, 2010, p. 27). Yet what is most important 
for Gadamer is that we do not give up (p. 27). If we have the resolve to face these imposing 
challenges and demands, pain becomes something that we are able to recover from (verwinden) 
(p. 27). By recovery, or, verwinden, Gadamer says he means a kind of “mastering” (Meisterung) 
of pain (p. 27). Yet this is not a mastering in the sense of dominance or command over pain, 
rather in the sense of coping (fertig zu werden), managing (fertigbringen), and coming to terms 
with pain. What Gadamer finds as perhaps “the most remarkable thing [das Verwunderlichste] in 
our remarkable lives” is our propensity to forget the most valuable and most impactful 
                                                 
4 All English translations in this essay of Gadamer’s presentation in Schmerz are my own.   
5 Gadamer only mentions the mother and doctor. However, this could of course be anyone aiding in the 
delivery of the newborn, such as a nurse, midwife, or doula.   
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experiences of our lives: “Forgetfulness is weakness” (p. 27). Pain, and our struggle with pain, is 
an opportunity to engage with that which most concerns us and with what most fulfills us (p. 27). 
It is a chance to come to terms with an original task that has been given to us: “The authentic 
dimension of one’s life becomes perceptible in one’s experience with pain, so long as one does 
not allow oneself to be conquered [überwinden lassen]” (p. 27). This, for Gadamer, is the great 
danger in modern medicine’s approach to pain, in that its immediate reaction to eradicate and 
eliminate a patient’s pain is to sacrifice the patient’s discovery of their own capabilities in 
healing and to lose the experience of the joys of one’s own ability and success in recovery (pp. 
27-28). 
 
This emphasis on the word verwinden, on a recovery from pain as one’s development of a 
sensibility towards pain, is crucial for Gadamer’s considerations and contains certain existential 
valences. Verwinden, while commonly used to mean an overcoming or the getting over of an 
illness (to “get over” a cold), also stems from the word winden, meaning to wind, coil, or contort.  
For Gadamer, the word verwinden implies that one cannot separate themselves from pain in their 
own recovery. Rather, resonating from its root word winden, the patient and his or her pain are 
intertwined and entangled with another. When one tends to this relationship and engages his or 
her pain, one opens up the possibility to heal and to not allow oneself to be über-wunden, to be 
conquered. It is in this way that verwinden also combats forgetfulness. As Gadamer points out, 
through our struggles with pain, we engage what most concerns us, what most occupies us, and 
what has been initially tasked to us. This engagement is then a reminder of a profoundly intimate, 
and perhaps forgotten, relationship one has with pain. Life begins with pain and one cannot 
separate oneself from pain, or to continue with the resonance of (ver)winden, one cannot unwind, 
uncoil, or disentangle oneself from this pain. To recover from pain is then to develop an 
appropriate sensibility towards pain; a sensibility that does not ignore, dominate, nor eradicate 
pain, but is willing to engage one’s pain as something deeply personal to oneself and perhaps 
reminiscent of one’s very first experience with the world.   
 
Gadamer’s Person of Experience 
 
Yet, there is still some question as to what Gadamer is driving at with this brief and perhaps 
cryptic reflection on pain, forgetfulness, and the birth cry in his “Defense of Pain.” At first blush, 
Gadamer’s talk on pain appears to merely advocate a more active role of the patient in their own 
relationship to pain, one which allows the patient to experience the joys of taking part in one’s 
own recovery. Yet it appears that Gadamer is suggesting that pain opens us up to an experience 
with something carrying more ontological and existential weight. What exactly have we 
forgotten and how is this revealed through approaching the demands of pain and reflecting on the 
image of the newborn’s cry at birth? In order to respond to some of these questions, I want to 
first return to his comments on the person of experience in Truth and Method in order to draw 
out the broader philosophical framework of hermeneutical consciousness and experience. With 
this in the background, we can then focus on his more specific comments on pain and health in 
The Enigma of Health. 
 
Gadamer’s comments in Truth and Method on being a person of experience, as one who 
participates in the movement of understanding and interpretation through developing an open 
disposition towards new experience, perhaps foreshadows the kind of open and engaging 
Crist  Journal of Applied Hermeneutics 2018 Article 10    5 
sensibility towards pain that Gadamer advocates in his later writings and lectures on health, pain, 
and medicine. At the beginning of chapter four of Truth and Method, Gadamer (summarizing 
Heidegger) explains the ontological process of understanding and interpretation in its relation to 
hermeneutics. What is important for both Heidegger and Gadamer is that there is no method or 
technique that is to be worked out, rather, they want to describe how interpretive understanding 
is achieved (Gadamer, 1960/2013, p. 279). When we interpret, that is, when we work through 
our projections of meaning for the world (or a text), it is crucial to be watchful of various 
“arbitrary fancies” and “imperceptible habits of thought” that deviate and distract ourselves from 
the “things themselves” (p. 279). In the process of understanding, we are constantly projecting 
possibilities and are always met with an “initial meaning” that emerges out of our various 
expectations, that is, out of our fore-projections (p. 279). Understanding is then the process of 
interpretation that constantly works through and revises these various fore-projections and fore-
meanings (p. 279). This is a process in which fore-projections and fore-meanings are constantly 
being exchanged for more appropriate ones:  
 
This constant process of new projection constitutes the movement of understanding and 
interpretation. A person who is trying to understand is exposed to distraction from fore-
meanings that are not borne out by the things themselves. Working out appropriate 
projections, anticipatory in nature, to be confirmed ‘by the things’ themselves, is the 
constant task of understanding. (p. 280)   
 
What is critical then for the process of understanding is an initial examination of the legitimacy 
of our own for-projections and fore-meanings (p. 280). Regarding textual interpretation, 
Gadamer explains that this kind of critical examination is enacted whenever we have the 
experience of being ‘pulled up short’ (Die Erfahrung des Anstoßes) by a text: “Either it [the text] 
does not yield any meaning at all or its meaning is not compatible with what we had expected” (p. 
280). Interpretive understanding then involves an interruption or disruption of our fore-meanings 
that invite us to “remain open to the meaning of the other person or text” (p. 281), thereby 
allowing us to continue to project new and meaningful possibilities in the process of interpretive 
understanding.   
 
This confrontation with alterity and the willingness to be open towards new and challenging 
developments in the process of understanding are both crucial aspects of Gadamer’s hermeneutic 
conception of the person of experience. In Truth and Method, Gadamer distinguishes 
hermeneutical consciousness from the Hegelian notion of absolute self-consciousness, namely, 
the former recognizes our inability to never fully supersede or sublate new experience or 
knowledge (Gadamer, 1960/2013, p. 364). A crucial insight for hermeneutical consciousness is 
that “the truth of experience always implies an orientation toward new experience. That is why a 
person who is called experienced has become so not only through experiences but is also open to 
new experiences” (p. 364). In this way, the experienced person is not someone who has simply 
amassed a collection of experiences, but has developed an ability to be open to and to learn from 
new experience:  
 
The experienced person proves to be, on the contrary, someone who is radically 
undogmatic; who, because of the many experiences he has had and the knowledge he has 
drawn from them, is particularly well equipped to have new experience and to learn from 
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them. The dialectic of experience has its proper fulfillment not in definitive knowledge 
but in the openness to experience that is made possible by experience itself. (p. 364)   
 
Yet this is not to imply that we can choose to ignore or avoid new experience altogether. 
Experience is something no one can be “spared” or be “exempt” from (p. 364). For Gadamer, 
these unavoidable experiences are often disappointing, painful, and disagreeable: “Every 
experience worthy of the name thwarts an expectation” (p. 364). Yet these are precisely the kinds 
of experiences that orient us towards newness, insight, and growth (p. 364). What one learns 
through this Aeschylian notion of “learning through suffering” is not a “particular thing, but 
insight into the limitations of humanity . . . Thus experience is experience of human finitude . . . 
The experienced man knows that all foresight is limited and all plans uncertain. In him is 
realized the truth value of experience” (p. 365). The person of experience is then one who 
constantly engages new experience and develops a sensibility towards the newness of experience. 
It is to be open to all the experiences of human finitude that consistently thwart our expectations 
and are also the kinds of experiences that allow us to grow, flourish, and resituate ourselves to 
the openness of new experience.    
 
Pain as a Return to Mortality and the Birth Cry 
 
In light of this Anstoß and openness that is proper to the person of experience and hermeneutic 
consciousness, we can now approach the close relationship Gadamer lays out between pain and 
health, such that a sensibility towards pain is to understand pain and suffering as constitutive of 
the rhythm of health. As previously mentioned, Gadamer touches on this in his talk on pain, 
where one’s fortitude in attending to the demands of pain, without merely numbing or 
eradicating this pain, allows one to experience the joys of taking part in their own convalescence 
and the development of their own capabilities in responding to this pain.   
 
On a more general level, he takes up the notion of health in his earlier essays, “Bodily 
Experience and Objectification,” and, “On the Enigmatic Character of Health,” as a kind of 
balance that is threatened by disturbance. In, “Bodily Experience and Objectification,” he wants 
to consider the hiddenness of health by first addressing how pain and suffering are taken up 
through the lens of modern medicine:  
 
We notice how pain and the suffering it inflicts change in character when they are no 
longer accompanied by the certainty or the expectation that it can be eliminated. This is 
something we know from contemporary medicine with its virtuosic capacity to ‘eliminate’ 
pain, the source of the pain, the symptom and sometimes even more than this. (Gadamer, 
1996, p. 76) 
 
Because of this capacity to rid the experience of pain, pain loses its status as something 
important or meaningful (p. 76). This attitude towards pain presents several challenges when 
trying to deal with, for instance, chronic or psychosomatic pain (p. 76), whereby “eliminating” 
this kind of pain is not so easily managed through surgery or pharmaceuticals.  In the case of 
“emotional disturbance and mental illness,” it is less a matter of 
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‘taking something away’ than of assisting in the process of adaptation and reentry into the 
cycle of human, social, professional and family life . . . to rediscover their own internal 
balance and equilibrium, strikes me as prototypical for the general experience of 
disturbance and the task of readaptation with which humankind has always been 
confronted, and with which it always will be confronted. (pp. 77-78) 
 
For Gadamer, this constant back and forth between “the loss of equilibrium and the search for a 
new point of stability” is how we experience the life of the body (p. 78). Health seems to be this 
point of stability, this equilibrium that is constantly threatened with disturbance, imbalance and 
disruption.   
 
Once again in “On the Enigmatic Character of Health,” illness, in modern medical science, is 
experienced as something “threatening and disruptive which we seek to be rid of” and becomes 
something we try to “master” or “gain control of” (Gadamer, 1996, p. 105). Pain is that which 
registers “a disturbance in that harmonious balance of bodily processes which constitutes health” 
(p. 108). Health, however, is not a state of utter stillness, immovability, or inactivity, rather it is a 
“general feeling of well-being,” whereby we are “open to new things, ready to embark on new 
enterprises and, forgetful of ourselves, scarcely notice the demands and strains which are put on 
us. This is what health is” (p. 112). However, because health involves a condition of an active, 
engaging, and rewarding kind of “being in the world,” health becomes something concealed 
from us and difficult to pin down (p. 113). What reveals our own health to us are precisely those 
“recalcitrant matters which intrude into our human experience of life” (p. 113). Health, then, is a 
rhythm of life, a continuous movement in which equilibrium is disrupted and must reestablish 
itself, and manifests its own robustness when we are able to manage these disruptions without a 
complete numbing of pain (pp. 113-116). Like the person of experience, the rhythm of health 
involves an openness towards the thwarting and disruptive experience of pain as that which is 
not merely destructive, but allows us to develop our own capacities in our return to this active 
and engaging sense of health. In the rhythm of health, we develop a sensibility towards the 
newness of painful experiences by being open to our own finitude, and engaging the challenges 
of our own convalescence as that which returns us to the active and dynamic movement of health.   
 
It is a reflection on this close relation between one’s pain and recovery, and the revelation of 
one’s own health through the very disturbance of this health, that then leads us to consider the 
more existential implications of Gadamer’s reference to forgetfulness and the birth cry, namely, 
the tension between anxiety, death, and life in his essay, “Anxiety and Anxieties.” Gadamer 
begins this essay with reference to Heidegger’s fundamental disposition or attunement of anxiety 
as that which reframes the question of the meaning of being. In section 40 of Being and Time, 
Heidegger describes anxiety as a disposition in which existence, or, Dasein is “brought before 
itself” (Heidegger, 2010, p. 178). While Dasein may take flight from itself and its own 
“authentic potentiality for being itself” (p. 178) amidst its involvement in the world, anxiety 
returns us to this authenticity. While anxiety does not appear to us as any particular object or 
coming from any particular location, it concerns the vastness and the strangeness of “the world 
itself” (p. 181). It is with Heidegger’s concept of anxiety in the background that Gadamer 
reminds us of a poem by the Baroque poet Friedrich von Logau that emphasizes the newborn’s 
cry at birth: “As soon as a newborn child feels the first touch of air it falls to crying. The sun 
must shine upon it for well nigh forty days before it starts to laugh. Oh in this our world, tears 
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predominate over laughter” (Gadamer, 1996, p. 153). Gadamer’s reference to this poem allows 
us to consider the birth cry as an expression of an intimate, primary, and constitutive relation we 
have always had with the world as one of alienation and strangeness, a relation we are 
confronted with in the experience of anxiety.  
 
More than this, for Gadamer, the lived experience of anxiety is closely tied to one’s own death. 
In reference to Heraclitus, Gadamer notes how wakefulness, or consciousness, is closely tied to 
its necessary and self-evident counterpart: death and our acceptance of death (Gadamer, 1996, p. 
155). Anxiety is closely linked then to our human tendency to strive to grasp this mystery of 
death. Yet, it is not the knowledge of death which causes this striving but something more 
fundamental that causes us to “repress the thought of death” (p. 155). It is this tension that 
Gadamer unpacks throughout this essay, namely, the role anxiety plays in our striving for an 
understanding of the mystery of death, while never being able to fully comprehend this profound 
relationship between anxiety, life, and death.   
 
Gadamer likewise references Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound to show how this tension is 
constitutive of human experience. While one interpretation of this drama emphasizes Prometheus 
bringing fire and technology to human beings, Gadamer is more taken with the interpretation that 
highlights how Prometheus’ real accomplishment was ridding human beings of the knowledge of 
their own death. It is this forgetting of death that Gadamer considers a necessary condition of life 
itself: “But this myth signifies the forgetting of death so that he no longer has to reckon with it. 
And yet, since no reckoning with death is possible and since death can never be overcome, this 
forgetting of death is never a real forgetting or overcoming, but rather constitutes life itself” 
(Gadamer, 1996, p.156). Anxiety is as an experience of alienation and strangeness to one’s own 
self and the world, and has “given human beings a distance from things” (p. 157). While it is a 
distance that threatens a Heideggerian inauthenticity, in which we remain distant from our own 
self or selves, it is also a distance that allows us to keep our horizons open to new and varied 
possibilities, and to authentically engage our own anxiety (p. 157).   
 
For Gadamer, all of this is bound up with the question: “To what extent can human life endure 
truth at all?” (Gadamer, 1996, p. 160). What seems necessary for him is the ability to “recognize 
and accept the fundamental disposition of anxiety in the face of life, and equally of death” as the 
“ontological privilege” of human beings (p. 162). What is at stake then, is not an understanding 
of the mystery of death, rather, the willingness to approach this tension with open eyes: “The life 
which awakens to thinking and questioning thinks and questions beyond all limits. To know 
anxiety and to be unable to grasp death, this is the human birth cry which never wholly dies 
away” (p. 162). To reflect on the birth cry is to reflect upon the mystery of our own mortality 
that has continued to echo throughout our lives from the very moment of our emergence into the 
world. Yet, as Gadamer indicates, this encounter with death and mortality in reflecting on the 
birth cry is not meant to paralyze one’s thought and activity, rather, it is meant to continue the 
conversation with the world and others that is prompted by this very cry at birth. The image of 
the birth cry is meant to open up and enliven our being-in-the-world. Like Gadamer’s robust 
sense of health, the birth cry may provoke and disturb with its resonance of finitude, yet our 
rehabilitation and reorientation from out of this engagement with the birth cry enriches our 
experience with the world and enacts a renewed vitality in our own worldly projects.   
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In this sense, we can think of Gadamer’s reflection on the birth cry in relation to Hannah 
Arendt’s focus on the idea of natality, namely, on the newness and possibilities of birth. For 
Arendt, birth and natality signal not the limiting and closing off character of an end, but the 
perhaps unexpected potential of a beginning:  
 
The new beginning inherent in birth can make itself felt in the world only because the 
newcomer possesses the capacity of beginning something anew, that is, of acting. In this 
sense of initiative, an element of action, and therefore of natality, is inherent in all human 
activities. (p. 9) 
 
For Arendt, just as much as death and mortality ground our engagement with the world, birth and 
natality are fundamental to the active, productive, and vital possibilities that are ever present in 
human experience. While Arendt wishes to situate the idea of natality much more in a political 
context, it nevertheless bears on Gadamer’s existential and hermeneutic considerations on the 
birth cry. While Gadamer certainly draws from the importance of death and anxiety found in 
Heidegger, the image of the birth cry also resonates with an openness, a newness, and an activity 
that is present in Gadamer’s sense of health. The birth cry is a painful and alienating emergence 
into the world, but is likewise an initiative. It is one’s first venture into interpreting and 
understanding one’s situatedness, and is thereby a first action that inspires newness, possibility, 
and creativity as essential to human experience.   
 
While the birth cry is the newborn’s cry at birth, what is left out of Gadamer’s particular focus is 
likewise the mother’s cry at birth.6 In his lecture on pain, Gadamer passingly mentions that the 
mother is perhaps one’s first interlocutor at birth, and is a conversation initiated by the 
newborn’s cry at birth. The mother is already situated in the particular context and world that the 
newborn emerges into, such that the mother experiences a similar hermeneutic and existential 
pain and alienation as the newborn in the moment of birth. Instead of the pain of an emergence 
into the world, the mother perhaps experiences the pain of separation, and of a loneliness bound 
up in the experience of anxiety. While anxiety is the experience of the strangeness and vastness 
of the world we are inextricably situated in, it likewise evokes a feeling of distance and 
separation from this world as well. At the moment of birth, both cries of the mother and the 
newborn signal the overwhelming experience of loneliness and alienation in this profound and 
transformative event. For the newborn, it is the intensity of the dislocation from the womb into 
the world. For the mother, it is the indescribable experience of a loss and separation. While both 
the mother and newborn experience the devastation of a loss, they also experience the beginnings 
of a new and richer conversation, one initiated by birth that transforms over a lifetime. It is the 
natality, the initiative, of the cries of both mother and newborn that project forth uncountable and 
unknowable possibilities into the world. It is in this moment that both mother and newborn begin 
their recovery from the physical and existential pain of birth. It is in taking up the challenges and 
demands of this pain that one first enters into a conversation with the other, with the newborn or 
the mother, and returns to the vibrant and dynamic rhythm of health.        
                                                 
6 I would like to thank Dr. Nancy Moules and the participants at the 2018 CHI for pointing me towards 
these considerations of the mother’s cry at birth. The following considerations are also not meant to 
accurately describe the real, cognitive, and sensory experiences of all women in childbirth, rather, to 
reflect on potential existential and hermeneutic considerations of the figure of the mother in the image of 
the newborn’s cry at birth.   




Gadamer’s brief presentation on pain manages then to resonate on several different registers, 
ultimately pressing one to think and return to their own existential origins and finitude. On a 
medical and practical level, Gadamer speaks to a renewed disposition that both medical 
professionals and patients ought to take in relation to the challenges and demands of pain. Rather 
than waging a war against pain, whereby pain is something eradicated or eliminated by purely 
chemical or surgical means, doctors and patients ought to develop the patient’s own healing 
capacities alongside the careful application of medical technology. On a more general level, 
Gadamer’s talk on pain raises the question of health in general, whereby pain, illness, and the 
disturbance of health play an important role in the rhythm or equilibrium of health itself. Health 
is not an unaffected and closed off state of inactivity, rather, health involves an active 
engagement with the world and others. Like the person of experience, health involves being open 
to the challenges of painful disruptions and convalescence. More than a mere collection of 
experiences with pain, a hermeneutic openness involves a disposition that is constantly open to 
these new and challenging experiences. Yet beyond these considerations, I want to suggest that 
Gadamer’s presentation on pain points to a reflection on a forgotten truth about our own 
mortality and about our own striving to understand the mystery of our own death and life, a 
mystery we will never fully grasp. Pain offers a chance to return to this mystery; not to fully 
master, control, or understand it, but as an authentic turn towards this tension as such. It is a 
chance to return to the pain and alienation of our first emergence into the world, the newborn’s 
cry at birth, and to come face to face with one’s own anxiety. In this way, Gadamer’s talk on 
pain echoes a particular sentiment from Kafka: “You can withdraw from the sufferings of the 
world – that possibility is open to you and accords with your nature – but perhaps that 
withdrawal is the only suffering you might be able to avoid” (Kafka, 2006, p. 102). For Gadamer, 
to eliminate the patient’s experience with pain, along with their participation in the recovery of 
their own pain, leads to a suffering of its own in this very withdrawal from pain. To be sure, 
Gadamer is not arguing for the removal of all pain medication and suggests that modern medical 
technology still plays an important role in the art of healing. Yet what is at stake in this 
eradication of pain is, on the one hand, the ability to take part in the joys of one’s own recovery 
and return to health. But just as much, and perhaps even more than this, it is the possibility of 
remembering and returning to a forgotten existential and ontological truth that echoes from out 
of the image of the birth cry: Only by continuing to authentically engage the irresolvable mystery 




Aho, K. (2017). A hermeneutics of the body and place in health and illness. In B.B. Janz, Place, 
space, and hermeneutics (Vol. 5, Contributions to hermeneutics, pp. 115-126). Cham, 
Switzerland: Springer. doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52214-2_9 
 
Arendt, H. (1958). The human condition. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Gadamer, H-G. (2010). Schmerz: Einschätzungen aus medizinischer, philosophischer und 
therapeutischer Sicht. Heidelberg, Germany: Winter. 
Crist  Journal of Applied Hermeneutics 2018 Article 10    11 
 
Gadamer, H-G. (1996). The enigma of health: The art of healing in a scientific age (J. Gaiger & 
N. Walker, Trans.). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
 
Gadamer, H-G. (2010). Schmerz: Einschätzungen aus medizinischer, philosophischer und 
therapeutischer Sicht. Heidelberg, Germany: Winter. 
 
Gadamer, H-G. (1960/2013). Truth and method (J. Weinsheimer & D.G. Marshall, Trans.). 
London, UK: Bloomsbury. 
 
Heidegger, M. (2010). Being and Time (J. Stambaugh & D. J. Schmidt, Trans.). Albany, NY: 
State University of New York Press. 
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